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CASE NOTES

which he felt the legislature never intended them to apply. Second, he
held that to allow an insured to make false statements at the trial level and
still collect on the policy would promote an undesirable state of affairs
whereby an insured could resort to all types of false swearing to collect
on his policy. However, although his first argument is correct as applied
to the court's method of interpreting public policy, as it has been pointed
out, the court need not have relied on the statutes nor public policy to
reach its decision. His second argument may be morally sound, in view of
the actions of the plaintiff, but the courts have consistently held that since
the insurance company suffers no loss, either by an increase of its risk or
by the loss of a defense as a result of the insured's false statements at the
trial level, it should not be allowed to use such false statements as a defense.
In conclusion, fraudulant or false swearing will cancel an insurance
policy, within the meaning of its forfeiture clause, (a) where it occurs
in the application for the policy and thereby increases the insurer's risk
or (b) where it occurs in the proof of loss thereby inducing the insurer
to make payment on a fraudulant claim; but it will not cancel the policy
where its only occurrence is after the suit has been instituted. The insurance company must have a valid defense for refusing to make payment
on its policy at the time it makes such a refusal, and it cannot wait until
the trial to acquire such a defense.

OIL AND GAS-MINES AND MINERALS-TITLE TO GAS
STORED IN NATURAL UNDERGROUND RESERVOIRS
Plaintiff, a public utility engaged in the business of transporting and
distributing natural gas to the public, maintained an underground storage
reservoir to meet the seasonal demands for gas. The reservoir consisted
of an exhausted gas field to which plaintiff held mineral rights except for
a small tract owned by defendants located in the southwest part of the
reservoir. After plaintiff commenced storing gas in the reservoir, defendants drilled a well on their tract and removed some of the stored gas.
Plaintiff brought an action for conversion and unjust enrichment. The
trial court held that plaintiff's petition did not state a cause of action
because, by analogy to the doctrine of animals ferae naturae, plaintiff
lost title to the gas by returning it to its natural state.1 On appeal, the
Texas Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that title
I Defendants also attacked the jurisdiction of the trial court in their pleadings and

briefs claiming the present action was a collateral attack on a certain order of the Railroad Commission of Texas authorizing the construction of defendants' well. The claim
was disposed of by stating this was a common law action to determine tide, and thus

the Railroad Commission had no jurisdiction to decide such a question.
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to natural gas injected into a natural reservoir is not lost in the absence
of an intent to abandon. Lone Star Gas Co. v. Murchison, 353 S.W. 2d
870 (1962).2
In holding that title to natural gas injected into an underground reservoir
is retained by the injector, the court rejected prior decisions3 and resolved
this question in accordance with current statutory law in at least three
states 4 and the views of most legal writers." Because of a lack of scientific
knowledge, early cases looked to other areas of law and found an analogy
in the law relating to animals ferae naturae.0 The first case to apply the
doctrine of animals ferae naturae to natural gas was Westmoreland &
Cambria Nat. Gas Co. v. DeWitt,7 decided in 1889, wherein the court
stated "[w]ater and oil, and still more strongly gas, may be classified ... as
minerals ferae naturae .. .they have the power and tendency to escape

without the volition of the owner." It is now recognized that this analogy
is contrary to scientific fact for gas and oil are securely entrapped in a
static condition in the original pool,9 and the injector of gas into such a
pool retains the ability to reduce it to his possession by extraction through
a well.
Under the animals ferae naturae doctrine, a wild animal becomes the
property of an individual only when removed from its natural liberty
and made subject to man's dominion. 10 If it escapes from custody anyone
has an equal right to capture it, unless the animal has animus revertendi,
i.e., the intention of returning, in which case a temporary departure from
control does not terminate property rights.'1 It is thus the ability to retain
control over a wild animal that determines ownership.
Nearly all courts hold that the land owner has the right to extract gas
in its natural state through wells located on his land even though the gas
2

Writ of errorrefused no reversible error. Under Texas practice this notation indi-

cates the Supreme Court of Texas was of the opinion the Court of Civil Appeals entered
the proper judgment but did not agree in all respects with the reasons given therefor.
1948, RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 483.
3Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co. v. Smallwood, 252 S.W. 2d 866 (Ky. App. 1952);
Hammonds v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 255 Ky. 685, 75 S.W. 2d 204 (1934).
4 CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 100, S 100-9-7 (1953); Mo. ANN. STAT. tit. 25, S 393-500
52, S 36.6 (Supp. 1960).
(Vernon Supp. 1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
5 See e.g., 1 SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS 167 (perm. ed. 1954); Comments 16 TEXAS L. REV.
370 (1938); 21 U. KAN.CITY L. RE. 217 (1954); 36 VA.L.REv.947 (1950).
6 See 1 SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS 167 (perm. ed. 1954).
VERNON'S TEXAS STAT.

7 130 Pa. 235, 18 Ad. 724 (1889).
8 Id. at 249, 18 Atl. 725.

9 Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W. 2d 558, 4 A.L.R. 2d 191 (1948).
See also Comment in 16 TEXAs L. REV. 370 (1938).
104 AM. JUR. 2d, Animals S 14 (1962).

11Id. S 19.
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may be drawn from adjoining property.1 2 Once gas is thus reduced to
possession by capture, it becomes the personal property of the person so
1
capturing it.
3 If gas is then injected into a natural underground reservoir,
it is still under the control of the person injecting it,14 and thus should
retain its character as the personal property of the injector, even though
the reservoir may be partially located under another's land.
The only prior cases in which a court of review has decided the issue
of title to gas injected into an exhausted gas field for storage purposes are

Hammonds v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co."5 and Central Kentucky
Natural Gas Co. v. Smallwood.16 Both of these were decided by the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky. In the Hammonds case, defendant stored
gas in an underground reservoir which was partially located under a
small tract owned by plaintiff who claimed the storage of gas in the
reservoir amounted to a trespass on her property. 17 The court denied
plaintiff's right to recover stating "[i]f one captures a fox in the forest and
turn it loose in another.., had he not done with that migratory, common
property just what the appellee has done with the gas in this case?"' The

Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co. v. Smallwood case involved a determination of who was entitled to rents and royalties as between the
surface owner and owner of the mineral rights, under leases providing for
underground storage of gas. The right to rents and royalties depended
upon ownership of the gas. The court, stating there was no distinction
in the title to gas once recovered and released for subterranean storage,
and native gas before its initial recovery, held that the owner of the mineral rights was entitled to the rents and royalties.
The only other reported decision on the issue is White v. New York
State Natural Gas Corp.,19 decided by a United States District Court in
1960, which is the first known decision to reject the Hammonds doctrine.
In the White case plaintiff held mineral rights with defendant in a nearly
12

24 AM.JUR. Gas and Oil § 6 (1939).

11d. § 3.

14 Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W.2d 558,4 A.L.R. 2d 191 (1948).

15 255 Ky. 685, 75 S.W. 2d 204 (1934). The Hannnonds case was cited with approval
in West Edmond Salt Water Dist. Ass'n v. Rosecrans, 204 Okla. 9, 226 P. 2d 965 (1951)
where in disposing of salt water defendants forced some under plaintiff's land. No actual
damages were shown and the court held defendants were not liable.
16 252 S.W. 2d 866 (Ky. App. 1952).

17 In the Lone Star case the question of trespass was not raised in the trial court, and
thus the Court of Civil Appeals refused to consider the issue. For a general discussion
see Stamm, Legal Problems in the UndergroundStorage of Natural Gas, 36 TEXAs L.
REv. 161 (1957).

18 Hammonds v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 255 Ky. 685, 689, 75 S.W. 2d
204, 206 (1934).
19 190 F. Supp. 342 (W.D.Pa. 1960).
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exhausted gas field. Defendant also held rights in an adjoining field, and
when it commenced storing gas therein, the pressure in the first field
greatly increased making it evident for the first time that the two fields
were in fact connected. Defendant then restricted production of gas from
the field in which plaintiff held rights, and plaintiff brought this suit for
an accounting and injunction restraining artificial restriction of the production of gas from the first field. The court rejected the analogy to
animals ferae naturae and held title to natural gas is not lost by the injection of such gas into a natural underground reservoir for storage purposes.
The interest of the public in the maintenance of such reservoirs is evidenced by statutes in eleven states providing for condemnation of exhausted gas fields by natural gas utilities, 20 in addition to the statutes in
three states rejecting the Hammonds doctrine.2 1 These laws enable a
natural gas public utility to better provide for the seasonal demands for its
product by storing reserve gas during the warm months.
The decision in the principal case indicates a definite trend from the
Hammonds doctrine when considered with the statutes rejecting the doctrine and the decision in the White case. The trend appears sound from
the viewpoint of public policy and scientific knowledge. The analogy to
the "fanciful fox" has been discarded, and a rule based on sound principles
of property law has been supplied in its place. The result indicates a
sound re-evaluation of this field of law.
20 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 100,

§§ 100-9-1-100-9-7 (1953); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 104,

9 104-112 (1961); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 55, §§55-120100055-1206 (Supp. 1959); Ky.
REV. STAT. ch. 278, § 278.501 (1955); MICH. STAT. ANN. ch. 230, S22.1672 (Supp. 1959);
Mo. REV. STAT. ch. 393,

§§ 393.410-393.510 (1959); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. tit. 60, §§ 60-

801-60-805 (Supp. 1957); NEB. REV. STAT. ch. 57, SS 57.601-57.607 (Cum. Supp. 1959);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 36.1-36.7 (Supp. 1960); PA. STAT. tit. 52 § 2401 (Supp. 1960);
W. VA. CoDEANN. ch. 54, § 5362 (2) (c) (1961).
2

1Supra note 4.

SALES-BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318
Plaintiff was employed as a truck driver by the Keal Driveaway Company. While he was delivering a new truck which had been manufactured
by the defendant, the brakes on the truck suddenly locked causing it to
overturn, resulting in injuries to the plaintiff. An action was brought for
personal injuries based on negligence and implied warranty. The trial
court dismissed the action upon plaintiff's failure to plead further after
the court had sustained a motion requiring the plaintiff to allege facts in
his second cause of action (breach of implied warranty) showing privity
of contract between plaintiff and defendant. On appeal the Court of Ap-

